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A COST-EFFECTIVE LOOK AT SPACECRAFT COMPONENT TESTING
Louis Gomberg
RCA Astro-Electronics Division 
Princeton, New Jersey
Summary
The trend towards fixed price programs accom­ 
panied by stringent schedule requirements, has forced 
RCA to make a critical reassessment of the traditional 
methods for testing spacecraft and spacecraft com­ 
ponents. The assessment consisted of a detailed review 
of the rationale for vacuum testing at the component 
level and a concommitant review of the failure history 
on several successful spacecraft programs. As a 
result, certain conclusions were drawn:
• Vacuum testing is only required on vacuum 
sensitive items;
• The sensitivity of these items could be 
predicted; and
• A thermal cycle test would be more protective.
These conclusions have now been implemented 
successfully in a major classified spacecraft program.
Introduction
It has been an act of faith in spacecraft testing to 
subject all spacecraft components to vacuum thermal 
testing prior to their integration on the spacecraft. 
With the emphasis on fixed-price contracts and 
stringent scheduling, a detailed reassessment was 
made of this philosophy. Asa result, it was concluded 
that many components did not require vacuum testing. 
Additionally, the components which will require vac­ 
uum testing can be predicted in advance. The remain­ 
der of this paper delineates the rationale and analyses 
which resulted in this decision.
The purpose of vacuum testing at the component 
level is to (1) provide confidence in its ability to per­ 
form in vacuum at the spacecraft test level and ulti­ 
mately in orbit; (2) determine the suitability of the 
design for vacuum operation; and ( 3) detect vacuum- 
sensitive anomalies.
For the program under consideration, the specified 
component test plan was carefully analyzed. It required 
all components to be tested in vacuum for 12 hours at 
each of three temperature levels with the temperature- 
time rate of change (dT/dt) unspecified. This program 
had been in existence for several years at RCA, and 
the test philosophy was thoroughly embedded.
An initial review of the failure history showed that 
the component tests were not as effective as they should 
have been in protecting against system failures. It 
appeared that the reason for this deficiency lay in the 
limited number of temperature cycles and the specified 
dT/dt which permitted gradual temperature transitions. 
Based on other program experience, it appeared that a
more effective test for weeding out incipient problems 
would consist of several thermal cycles with a dT/dt 
of approximately 0. 5°C per minute. It also became 
apparent that it would be desirable for test facility, 
and schedule reasons that the test be performed with a 
temperature box. To ascertain whether this was pos­ 
sible, a systematic review of the merits of vacuum 
testing was conducted. This took the form of an analy­ 
sis of the failure history of several RCA programs 
(for example, Relay, Lunar Orbiter, RAE, and a clas­ 
sified program). A review of the effects of vacuum on 
the materials and parts in the articles and on the arti­ 
cles' actual function was conducted.
Effects of Vacuum Operation
When designing for vacuum operation, considera­ 
tion must be given to:
• Temperature — in a vacuum, convection is no 
longer present as a heat transfer process.
• Outgassing — materials with high vapor pres­ 
sure will change state from a solid to a gas. 
Additionally, some gas may be absorbed or 
trapped in the conformal coating, etc.
• Sublimation — certain metals and other mate­ 
rials will vaporize in vacuum and deposit on 
the nearest cold surface.
• Breakdown — in vacuum, effects such as
Paschen's law, multipactor, electrical arcing 
and other phenomena become a serious con­ 
sideration.
• Dimensional anomalies — the loss of atmos­ 
pheric pressure can cause dimensional distor­ 
tion in housings, boards and parts.
• Migration of lubricating materials — certain 
lubricants tend to migrate or otherwise dis­ 
appear in vacuum.
• Cold welding — rotating or sliding metal parts 
may stick or cold-we Id in vacuum under certain 
conditions.
It became clear that not performing vacuum testing 
might permit deficiencies in the areas cited to go un­ 
detected and prevent verification at the component test
level. To determine whether this was a real possibil­ 
ity, each component was reviewed in terms of its mate­ 
rials, parts, application and history for possible prob­ 




To compensate for the addition of convection as a 
thermal heat transfer process, 5°C was added to the 
top end of the temperature. Thus, components sub­ 
jected to thermal cycling underwent temperature level 
tests which were 5°C higher than those required in 
vacuum. This was considered by the thermal group 
to be more than adequate compensation.
Qutgassing
All parts and materials were reviewed to provide 
assurance that they will not outgas. For example, all 
RCA components utilize printed circuit board con­ 
struction, employing 2 -ounce G-li glass epoxy with 
electrolytic copper traces coated with reflowed, elec­ 
tro-deposited Sn-Pb (60 to 40 percent). These boards 
and the process for their fabrication have been suc­ 
cessfully employed by RCA for the past five years on 
such programs as TIROS, Lunar Orbiter, RAE-AAS, 
Ranger, etc.
The conformal coatings used were originally de­ 
veloped for TIROS and Lunar Orbiter and then used on 
other programs. Precautions against gas entrapment 
and incomplete coatings formulation are provided by 
de-aerating such materials (pulling a vacuum) when 
mixing, and a high temperature bake after application. 
Again, these formulations have been thoroughly qual­ 
ified for use in vacuum by virtue of extensive testing 
prior to their adoption. Verification of the success 
of these methods is provided by the successful per­ 
formance in the cited programs.
The housings are made of 6061-T6 aluminum 
(0.040-inch thick typical and the tape recorders 0.100 
inch; all components are painted with a polyamine 
epoxy paint which is space-qualified ). The harness 
wire, internal to the components, is made of Teflon- 
coated copper wire; the connectors are all gold-plated 
brass. Thus, there is nothing employed which can 
outgas significantly. There still remained the possi­ 
bility that improper materials might be inadvertently 
employed or the process might not be properly imple­ 
mented. Since this possibility existed on previous 
programs, an extensive review of RCA malfunctions 
and test discrepancy history was made to determine 
what the frequency of occurrence of this type of prob­ 
lem had been. Not one vacuum malfunction in over 
10, 000 analyzed could be attributed to improper mate­ 
rials or an incorrectly implemented process in apply­ 
ing these materials.
Sublimation
Every part and material was and is reviewed by 
knowledgeable personnel prior to its acceptance for
use in a spacecraft program to ensure that it does not 
contain material which could sublimate. For example,
zinc and cadmium and was-impregnated lacing 
tape are not permitted.
The effectiveness of these controls has been veri­ 
fied by reviewing the failure history. Again no failures 
were attributed to sublimation.
The factors which can initiate electrical break­ 
down in vacuum are well known. These are:
• Voltages present in excess of 200 volts.
• Presence of substantial amounts of RF power.
• High voltage gradients (volts/mil) resulting 
from sharp edges, etc.
The spacecraft components were reviewed as 
delineated in the attached table. The only components 
liable to have problems in this area are transmitters.
Momentum wheel assemblies, despite their low 
voltage application, were tested in vacuum to provide 
a reference for motor current and assure adequate 
lubrication throughout the system.
Tape Recorders. Since the recorders are hermet­ 
ically sealed, pressurized and helium -leak tested after 
each environmental exposure, it was decided that it 
would be safe to forego the vacuum portion of the test.
DC-DC Converters. Although there are no high 
voltages present, it was decided to subject the proto­ 
type units to thermal vacuum because of the newness 
of the design.
Dimensional Stability. The design precautions 
required to obviate problems in this area are well 
known and have been taken on the program. These 
precautions include:
• Adequate numbers of vent holes.
• Structurally-sound design (that is, covers are 
dimpled; materials have adequate safety 
factors).
Assurance that these measures are more than 
adequate is provided by the previous performance of 
RCA hardware. Additionally, a series of tests was 
conducted on Lunar Orbiter. The rapid ascent of the 
launch vehicle introduced the possibility of distortions. 
A series of tests was conducted which required each 
component to be pressurized to two atmospheres. The 
chamber was then opened, resulting in a rapid decom­ 
pression. There was no evidence of any distortion.
Lubrication Migration
This is a significant problem, as evidenced by 
several shutter problems experienced on certain pro­ 
grams. The use of a properly qualified space grease, 
Versilube (G-300), obviated the condition. However, 
to avoid problems, all shutters and open switches were 
exposed to vacuum as part of the acceptance test 
procedure.
Cold Welding
This is a recognized phenomenon in vacuum. The 
safest course is to pressurize and to expose all such 
components to vacuum testing.
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The following paragraphs summarize the RCA 
failure history on several recent spacecraft programs. 
The conclusions are that components which will be 
vacuum-sensitive can be successfully anticipated.
Relay I. On the Relay I program, there were a 
total of 141 malfunctions at the component, subsystem 
and spacecraft levels. Of these, 79 (56 percent) were 
associated with the wideband systems (receiver,beacon 
and transmitter); 25 (17. 8 percent) occurred in 
thermal vacuum, and 4 of these (3 percent of the total 
number of malfunctions) required vacuum to evidence 
themselves. All of these were in the TWT and associ­ 
ated power supply. This could have been anticipated 
because of high voltages (EH - 1200 V, ECO]J - 600V) 
and high RF power (10 watts at 1600 MHz).
Relay II. A total of 78 malfunctions were reported 
at all levels of testing, 60 in component level and 18 
on the spacecraft level. Exactly 9 (11.5 percent) 
occurred in vacuum; of these, two required vacuum to 
occur. Not unexpectedly, these involved the TWT and 
associated high voltage supply. *
It is also interesting to note that the percentage of 
thermal vacuum failures is higher at the spacecraft 
level than at the component level. This would seem to 
indicate that the spacecraft test, because of the addi­ 
tional handling, longer test times, and more careful 
data review, is more effective in detecting failures.
Lunar Orbiter. There were a total of 1130 test 
discrepancies at all levels of test; that is, board, 
component, subassembly and spacecraft. These break 
down into:
196 board level malfunctions 
931 component and subassembly 
__3 spacecraft
1130 total malfunctions
Of these, 260 (or 23 percent) occurred in thermal 
vacuum. Four required vacuum to evidence the failure. 
These included:
• A breakdown of the TWTA (12 watts at S-band) 
bandpass power monitor filter at critical 
pressure.
• A breakdown of Teflon-insulated wire in the 
TWT power supply. The supply was required 
to put out a helix voltage (En ) of 1200 volts 
and a collector voltage of 600 volts. The fix 
was to put in silicone rubber wire.
• A breakdown of a capacitor in the TWT power 
supply in spacecraft test. The failure was 
attributed to an accidental crease of an alumin­ 
um sheet in the capacitor stack causing a volt­ 
age stress. The unit had passed FAT in vac­ 
uum at the power supply and TWTA level.
• A breakdown of flex wiring in the TWTA in 
vacuum. Again this was corrected by using 
silicone-insulated wire.
All of these failures could have been anticipated 
in light of the criteria cited previously.
Ancenna Aspect Subsystem of the Radio Astronomy 
Explorer Satellite. There were a total of 54 failures 
at all levels of test. Of these, four occurred in vac­ 
uum, of which two required vacuum to manifest them­ 
selves.
• A failure of the dc-dc converter, which was 
required to produce 400 volts from a 24 volt 
bus in vacuum. The problem was anticipated, 
tests conducted and a fix, better venting, was 
implemented.
• A failure of a shutter blade in vacuum. In this 
case, the addition of Versilube G-300 eliminated 
the condition. Again, the problem could have 
been anticipated on the basis of the ground rules 
cited.
Classified Program, Phase A. On this program, 
there were a total of 114 malfunctions and discrepan­ 
cies reported. Of these, 18 occurred in vacuum and 
18 in thermal tests. One required vacuum to manifest 
itself; this was the magnetic stepper switch where the 
lubrication was found to have disappeared, and the use 
of Versilube G-300 corrected the problem. The trans­ 
mitters were chronic problems, passing the supplier's 
vacuum but failing in the spacecraft vacuum. They 
subsequently failed in thermal testing at the supplier 
after extensive temperature cycling.
Classified Program, Phase B. Asa whole, there 
were a total of 117 test discrepancies at the component 
level on this program. This broke down into 32 in 
thermal vacuum and 23 in thermal tests. Considering 
the longer exposure time in vacuum, it would appear 
that the thermal test is equally good at detecting prob­ 
lems at the article level. None of the vacuum failures 
would have required the vacuum test to manifest 
themselves.
Conclusions
The following conclusions were made as a result 
of this study:
• RCA is convinced, based on its experience, 
that thermal test is equally as efficient as 
thermal vacuum in detecting incipient defects 
on certain nonvacuum- sensitive components.
• The thermal cycle is more effective than 
temperature-vacuum storage tests in vacuum,
• Certain articles are vacuum-sensitive. These 
can be identified in advance in terms of their 
performance, parameters, construction, func­ 
tion or parts.
• Thermal vacuum, as performed on previous
programs, has not been particularly protective
in spacecraft tests.
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